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Abstract—Typically, software development processes are time consuming, expensive, and rigorous, particularly for safety-
critical applications. Even if guidelines and recommendations are defined by sector-specific functional safety standards, 
development may not be completed because of excessive costs or insufficient planning. The V-model is one of the most well-
known software development life cycle models. In this study, the V-model is modified by adding an intermediate step. The 
proposed modification provides three advantages: (1) it checks whether the constructed model covers all software requirements 
related to faults; (2) it enables simple coding; and (3) it decreases costs by early detection of modeling deficiencies before the 
model coding and testing phases. Since the proposed modification includes discrete event system-based fault diagnosis, its 
applicability to only automata and Petri net models (modules) can be considered a disadvantage. 
Index Terms—Software development lifecycle, V-model, fault diagnosis, discrete event systems, EN 50128, fixed-block railway 
signaling systems.  
1 INTRODUCTION
HE concept known as Safety Integrity Level (SIL) is used to quantify safety. The SIL is a degree of safety system 
performance for a Safety Instrumented System (SIS), which is an automatic system used to avoid accidents and to 
reduce their impact both on humans and the environment. An SIS has to execute one or more Safety Instrumented 
Functions (SIFs) to maintain a safe state for the equipment under control [1]. Bear in mind that, the safe state is known 
as the state where the whole system is prevented from falling into a dangerous situation. An SIF has a designated SIL 
level depending on the ratio of risk that needs to be decreased. IEC 61508, the standard for functional safety of electri-
cal/electronic/programmable-electronic safety-related systems (SRSs), mentions that an SIL should be designated to 
each SIF and defines the safety integrity as the probability of a Safety Related System (SRS) adequately performing the 
required safety functions under all the stated conditions within a given period of time. From the lowest requirement 
level (SIL 1) to highest requirement level (SIL 4), SILs have four levels in the standards. 
In IEC 61508, SRSs are classified into two types of operations: high and low demand. When the demand rate is both 
less than once a year and less than twice the proof test frequency, the SIS operates in a low demand mode. Otherwise, a 
high demand mode of operation is taken into account. Here, Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD) is the main relia-
bility measure for low-demand SISs. On the other hand, for high demand operations the Probability of Failure per 
Hour (PFH) is the preferred measure. The SIL verifies whether the average probability of failure on demand (PFDavg) 
of the underlying SRS meets the required failure measure, where the average is computed over the operational time 
interval between periodic proof tests [2]. The target failure measures are tabulated in Tables 2 and 3 of IEC 61508-1 
Edition 2 or in Tables 3 and 4 of IEC 61511-1 [3]. IEC 61511 has been developed as a process sector implementation of 
the generic standard IEC 61508. 
When SRS are taken into consideration, the failure rate () is one of the most important parameters. While, the fail-
ure rate of a new parameter can be established experimentally, for existing components it can be found in special 
handbooks. The reliability function, which describes the failures of items, is completely determined by . 
The third part of IEC 61508 applies to any software used to develop a safety-related system within the scope of first 
and second parts of the standard, and establishes the requirements for safety life cycle phases. Industry and domain 
specific implementations of IEC 61508 include IEC 61511 for industrial processes, IEC 61513 for the nuclear industry, 
and IEC 62061 for machinery etc. 
A lifecycle model is defined in [4] as a model that describes stages in a software product development process. The IEC 
61508-4 standard discusses the term life cycle in the context of both safety lifecycle and software lifecycle. The safety life 
cycle includes the necessary activities involved in the implementation of SRSs [5]. IEC 61508 states that a safety life 
cycle for software development shall be selected and specified during the safety-planning phase in accordance with 
Clause 6 of IEC 61508-1. The safety life cycle includes the definition of scope, hazard and risk analysis, determination 
of safety requirements, installation, commissioning, validation, operation, maintenance, repair, and decommissioning. 
On the other hand, the software life cycle includes the activities occurring from the conception of the software to the 
decommissioning of the software. This life cycle deals with the definition of the software requirements, software de-
sign, software integration, and software tests. 
Numerous life cycle models have been addressed in the literature, such as the waterfall, spiral, iterative develop-
ment, and butterfly models [6–12]. However, despite the availability of many life cycle alternatives, railway-related 
safety standards such as IEC 61508, EN 50126, EN 50128, and IEC 62278 recommend using the V-model for software 
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development processes. The V-model life cycle has been applied to various domains such as the automotive [13], aero-
space [14], railways [15], and the nuclear industry [16]. 
In this study, a Discrete Event System (DES)-based fault diagnosis method is added to the V-model life cycle as an 
intermediate step. The proposed modification provides three advantages: (1) it checks whether the constructed soft-
ware model covers all software requirements related to faults; (2) it decreases costs by the early detection of modeling 
deficiencies prior to the V-model coding and testing phases; and (3) it enables simple coding. Since the proposed modi-
fication includes DES-based fault diagnosis, it is only applicable to automata and Petri net models (software modules), 
which can be considered a disadvantage. 
Even if there are many model checking tools and techniques in the literature [17-21], the proposed enhancement is 
not complex as previously proposed methods. Because the diagnoser is built from the model itself and; since the mod-
ular approach is a must in the Software Design phase of the V-model in EN 50128 [22] (recommended as mandatory) 
there is no need to any tool to check the diagnosability of a simple module (component) model. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The V-model lifecycle and the DES-based fault diagnosis 
scheme are explicated in Sections II and III, respectively. The enhanced V-model is introduced in Section IV, and con-
clusion section is given in Section V. 
2 V-MODEL LIFECYCLE 
Paul Rook introduced the V-model life cycle in 1986 as a guideline for software development processes [4]. The prima-
ry aim of the V-model is to improve both the efficiency of software development and the reliability of the produced 
software. The V-model offers a systematic roadmap from project initiation to product phase-out [4]. The V-model also 
defines the relationship between the development and test activities; it implements verification of each phase of the 
development process rather than testing at the end of the project. The V-model, as defined in IEC 61508-3, is shown in 
Fig. 1. 
Before initializing a software development process according to the V-model, a software planning phase has to be real-
ized, wherein a software quality assurance plan, software verification and software validation plans, and a software mainte-
nance plan are fully defined. Later, the software requirements should be determined in cooperation with both the cus-
tomer and the stakeholders. Using the selected software architectures (including modeling methods), software mod-
ules (or components) are developed by the designers. Each phase is verified immediately after completion. Note that 
the left side of the V-model (Fig. 1) represents the decomposition of the problem from the business world to the tech-
nical world [23]. After the coding phase, the right side of the V-model denotes the testing phase of the developed soft-
ware. 
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Fig. 1. V-model software safety integrity and development lifecycle [18]. 
 
The advantages and disadvantages of the V-model can be summarized as follows [6, 7, 23]: 
Advantages 
1. Facilitates greater control due to the standardization of products in the process. 
2. Cost estimation is relatively easy due to the repeatability of the process. 
3. Each phase has specific products. 
4. Greater likelihood of success because of the early development of test plans and documentation before coding. 
5. Provides a simple roadmap for the software development process. 
 
Disadvantages 
1. Low flexibility, expensive, and difficult to change scope. 
2. No early prototypes. 
  
3. Addresses software development within a project rather than a whole organization. 
4. Too simple to precisely reflect the software development process and may steer managers into a false sense of secu-
rity. 
3 DES-BASED FAULT DIAGNOSIS 
An event is defined as an encountered specific action, i.e., an unplanned incident that occurred naturally or due to nu-
merous conditions that are encountered simultaneously [25]. A DES is a discrete-state, event-driven system in which 
the state evolution of the system depends totally on the occurrence of discrete events over time. Events are classified as 
observable or unobservable events in a DES. 
In DES-based fault diagnosis, diagnosability can be summarized as follows. A system (or software module) is con-
sidered as diagnosable if it is possible to identify, within a finite delay, occurrences of precise unobservable events that 
are referred to as fault events [26]. In other words, a system is accepted as diagnosable if the fault type is always identi-
fied within a uniformly bounded number of transition firings after the occurrence of the fault [27]. The diagnoser is 
obtained from the system model itself and carries out diagnostics to observe the system behavior. Diagnoser states 
involve fault information, and occurrences of faults are identified within a finite delay by examining these states [28]. 
Although the meanings of failure and fault are considered the same by DES researchers, they are defined differently in 
the EN 50128 safety standard. In this study, we use the term fault rather than failure.  
Finite state machines and Petri nets are considered as DES-based modeling methods and, these methods are also 
highly recommended by railway-related functional safety standards [22]. Therefore, DES-based fault diagnosis can be 
used when developing software modules for railway signaling software. 
3.1 Basic Petri net (PN) Definitions 
A Petri net [29] is defined as; 
  0, , , ,PN P T F W M   (1) 
where 
 P = {p1, p2, …, pk} is the finite set of places, 
 T = {t1, t2, …, tz} is the finite set of transitions, 
 F ⊆ (P T)   (T P) is the set of arcs, 
 W: F → {1, 2, 3, …} is the weight function, 
 M0: P → {0, 1, 2, 3, …} is the initial marking, and 
 P T   and P T  . 
The sets  jO t  and  jI t  are used to denote output places and input places of transition tj, respectively, as follows: 
      : ,j i j iO t p P t p F ,  (2) 
      : ,j i i jI t p P p t F   (3) 
For a marking M,   iM p n  represents the token number of the ith place where it is equal to n [29]. Representa-
tion of a marking  : 1, 2, 3, ...M P  can be realized by a k-element vector, where k denotes the total number of 
places. 
Definition 1 [25]: A transition tj assumed as ready to fire (enabled) at a marking M if each input place pi of tj has at 
least  ,i jW p t  tokens, where  ,i jW p t  is the arc weight from place pi to transition tj, i.e.,     ,i i jM p W p t  for all 
 i jp I t . 
Keep in mind that the transition tj is always ready to fire if   jI t . Firing of an enabled transition depends on 
whether the event actually occurs or not. When an enabled transition tj is fired,  ,i jW p t  tokens are removed from 
each input place  i jp I t  and  ,j iW t p  tokens are added to each output place  i jp O t , where  ,j iW t p  is the 
weight of the arc from tj to pi. Thus,  
          , ,i i i j j iM p M p W p t W t p ,  (4) 
Here, the new token number in the ith place is represented by   iM p  after the firing of transition tj. If a transi-
tion tj is enabled at a marking M, then it is represented by   jM t . In addition, if the firing of tj at M results with 
  
M , then it is represented by   jM t M . 
Definition 2 [29]: If a PN has no self-loops, then it is considered as pure and when all arc weights of a PN are 1, the it 
is said to be ordinary. 
Definition 3 [29]: 

       0 1 1 2 1k k kM t M t M t M  means that, the marking Mk is reachable from the initial marking 
M0 by the 1 2 kt t t  transitions sequence. Note that,  0R M  denotes the set of all reachable markings from M0. 
Definition 4 [29]: A PN is said to be l-bounded if the token number in each place do not exceed a finite number l, i.e., 
       0 ,  :k i k iM R M p P M p l . Note that a PN is 1-bounded then, it is assumed as safe. 
Definition 5 [29, 30]: A PN is said to be free from deadlocks if it is possible to find at least one enabled transition at 
every reachable marking,   0kM R M . 
The set of places, P is partitioned into a set of observable places and a set of unobservable places (Po and Puo) [27]. 
Likewise, the set of transitions, T is partitioned into a set of observable transitions and a set of unobservable transitions 
(To and Tuo). Thus, the partitioned sets for P and T can be expressed as 
 
uo o
P P P  and  uo oP P ,  (5) 
 
uo o
T T T  and  uo oT T .  (6) 
In addition, a subset TF of Tuo represents a faulty transitions set. It is assumed that there are m different fault types. 
Here,    1 2,  ,  ,  F mF F F is the set of fault types. TF is expressed as 
   
1 2 mF F F F
T T T T ,  (7) 
where  
i jF F
T T  (if i j ).     2 FN  is used to define the label set, where N is used to represent the label 
“normal,” which specifies that all fired transitions are not faulty, and 2 F represents the power set of 
F F
 , i.e., 
2 F is the set of all subsets of 
F F
 . In the remainder of this paper, unobservable transitions and places are rep-
resented as shown in Fig. 2. 
Unobservable transition and place
Observable transition and place
 
Fig. 2. Unobservable and observable places and transitions. 
 
3.2 Diagnosis of Faults Using PN Models 
Since the system model contains unobservable places, it is not always possible to distinguish some markings. Thus, 
if 1 2( ) ( )i iM p M p  for any i op P , then its denotes as 1 2M M . That is to say, M1 and M2 markings have the same ob-
servations. As done in [31], the definition of the quotient set  0Rˆ M  according to the equivalence relation    is useful; 
      
0
0 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ: : ,  ...,  ,  ...
n
R M
R M M M  where 
0 0
ˆM M . An observable marking or the observation of a marking is rep-
resented by each member of  0Rˆ M . We assume the following two statements are true for simplicity. 
Assumption 1 [26, 27]: A PN given by equation (1) is free from deadlocks. 
Assumption 2 [26, 27]: There does not exist an order of unobservable transitions whose firing produces a cycle of 
markings that have the same observation; i.e., for any   0iM R M  and  ,  1, 2, ...,  k uot T k n , 
           1 1 2 2 1 , 1,  2,  ,  : k k k jM t M t M t M k j n M M .  
At this point, a diagnoser definition [26, 27, 31] is given for a PN. A diagnoser state qd is given as 
       1 1 2 2, , , , , ,d n nq M l M l M l , which involves pairs of a marking   0iM R M  and a label il . The symbol 
  
 0
x
2
R M
Q  represents the power set of   0 xR M ; i.e., each member of Q is a subset of   0 xR M  and is given as 
      1 1 2 2, , , , , ,n nM l M l M l . The diagnoser is given by 
   0,  ,  ,  d d o dG Q q .  (8) 
 
  
The diagnoser given by (8) is an automaton where the set of states are represented by dQ Q , the set of events are 
represented by    0ˆo oR M T , the notation   :d d o dQ Q  represents the partial state transition function, and the 
initial state is denoted by   0 0 ,q M N . The state set dQ Q  represents the reachable states from the initial state q0 by 
using d . Each observed event  o o  represents an observation of a marking in  0Rˆ M  or an observable transition in 
To. The state transition function d  is defined with the use of the label propagation function and the range function. 
The label propagation function   *0:LP R M T  transfers the label (faulty or normal) over an order of transi-
tions  *s T . Here, T* denotes the set of all finite sequences of the members of T [26, 27]: 
 
   
 
     
 
  
, ,
, if :
: , otherwise,
i
i
i F F
i i F
LP M l s
N l N F T s
F F l T s
,   (9) 
where 
iF
T s  ( 
iF
T s ) indicates that a sequence of transitions  *s T  includes (or does not include) a faulty transition 
with fault type Fi. If the sequence of transitions does not contain any faulty transition, in this case, the resulting mark-
ing is labeled as normal (N). If the sequence of transitions contains a faulty transition, then the resulting marking is 
labeled with the corresponding fault type. In that case, the range function  : oLR Q Q  is determined as follows: 
 
   
   


 

*, ,
, , , ,
o
o
M l q s T M
LR q M LP M l s , (10) 
where  M s M  and   
* *,
o
T M T  is defined in the next two cases. 
1. If    0ˆ ,o R M  
 
 
  




 
    
        
*
*
,
, if 
:
, otherwise,
             :
o
o
uo s o
s
T M
M
s T M
s s s M M
,      (11) 
where   sM s M ,   sM s M , and s  denotes the set of all prefixes of s. In (11), the case of  oM  corresponds to a 
change of the observable marking. Here,  * , oT M  is the set of sequences 
*
uo
s T  of unobservable transitions such that 
during the firing of s, all interval observable markings except the last one in 
o
 are the same. 
2. If  o oT , [27] 
 
 
    



   
  
        
*
* , ,
    : :
uo o
o
s
s T
T M
M s s s s M M
   (12) 
where 

  sM s M . If the firing of an observable transition  o oT  is observed, then  
* ,
o
T M  is the set of sequences of 
unobservable transitions followed by 
o  such that all interval observable markings except the last one are the same. In 
other words,  * , oT M  is the set of possible transition sequences from M that are consistent with the observed event

o
. 
Lastly, the state transition function   :d d o dQ Q  is defined as follows [26, 27]: 
 
    
 
 
 

, , if ,
,
undefined, otherwise.
o o
d o
LR q LR q
q    (13). 
 
3.3 Obtaining Diagnosability 
A PN is accepted as diagnosable, if the faulty type is identified for all time within a uniformly bounded number of 
transition firings after the fault occurrence [27]. In other words, a PN is considered as diagnosable if, and only if, the 
diagnoser given by (8) does not involve an Fm-indeterminate cycle for any fault type Fm. Detailed explanation and the 
proof of this theorem is given in [26]. 
  
3.4 Railway Point Example 
Trains can pass from one track to another by railway points placed at necessary locations. Since the trains do not have 
any steering mechanism, they use railway points to pass from one track to another. Points have two position indica-
tions, i.e., Normal (Nr) and Reverse (Rev). At any railway point, three main faults may occur. These faults are identified 
in the V-model software requirements specification phase as follows: 
 F1: Point may not reach the desired position in a predefined time (e.g., 5 s) while moving from Nr to Rev. 
 F2: Point may not reach the desired position in a predefined time (e.g., 5 s) while moving from Rev to Nr. 
 F3: Both position indications may be received simultaneously. 
Examples of diagnosable and non-diagnosable PN models of a railway point are given in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, respec-
tively. The meanings of the transitions and places of the models in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 are given in Table I and Table II, 
respectively. Note that the striped places and transitions represent unobservable places (Puo) and transitions (Tuo), 
whereas the other places (Po) and transitions (To) are observable. Mo represents the initial marking of the Petri net. 
The representation of the PN model in Fig. 3 is as follows: 
 
 





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PM_1 PM_2 PM_3 PM_4 PM_5 PM_6 PM_7 PM_8 PM_9
PM_10 PM_11 PM_12 PM_13 PM_14
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       ... , , , , ,
,
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uo
o
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T t t t t t t t t t
t t t t t
T t t 
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       
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
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, ,
, , , ,...
       ... , , , ,...
       ... , , ,
        0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0 .
f f
t
M M P M P M P M P
M P M P M P M P
M P M P M P M P
   (14) 
The three different fault types given in Fig. 3 are    1 2 3,  ,  F F F F , where  1 PM_ 1F fT t ,  2 PM_ 2F fT t , and  3 PM_ 3F fT t . 
The rectangles are used to diminish the complexity of the PN model. Each rectangle represents the label of the related 
place. 
The diagnoser illustrated in Fig. 3 is built from the railway point model itself. A rectangle is used to denote each 
state and each state contains a pair of place markings and an attached label, normal (N) or fault   , 1,2,3mF m . In 
other words, in parts of the diagnoser, a marking immediately after an observed event is detected precisely. 
In accordance with the definition of the diagnoser in (8), a label which represents an observable transition or the ob-
servation of a marking is attached to all diagnoser state transitions. In this study, with a slight abuse of notation, labels 
containing the observation of a marking or a pair of the observation of a marking and an observable transition are 
attached to all state transitions of the diagnoser. 
For example, at _ 0
ˆ
PM
M  in Fig. 3, the event label _ 10
ˆ
PM
M  represents that the observable marking _ 10
ˆ
PM
M  is observed by 
firing the unobservable transition tPM_f3. Similarly, the diagnoser state changes from    0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0, , ,N  to 
   0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0 , ,N  as a function of firing the observable transition tPM_2 with the observation _ 1ˆ PMM  of the 
resulting marking. According to the definition given in Section III-C, since there is no Fi-indeterminate cycle in the 
diagnoser, the PN model is diagnosable. 
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Fig. 3. PN model of a railway point and its diagnoser (diagnosable). 
 
 
 
Representation of the PN model in Fig. 4 is as follows: 
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   (15) 
The diagnoser in Fig. 4 is not diagnosable because it is not possible to distinguish the fault type after observing the 
marking _ 5
ˆ
PM
M . The software model in Fig. 4 seems to contain all the software requirements related to the faults; 
however, the developed software model is not diagnosable, which means that the PN model will identify only 
one of the faults, F1 or F2. Therefore, the designers should revise the PN model before proceeding to the coding 
phase; otherwise, this deficiency will result in an unsuccessful test case in the V-model module-testing phase. 
 
 
TABLE 1 
DEFINITIONS OF TRANSITIONS AND PLACES IN THE MODELS GIV-
EN IN FIG. 3. 
Place Definition Transition Definition 
PPM_1 
Nr position re-
quested 
tPM_1 
Safety criteria are 
met, point Nr 
position request 
PPM_2 
Rev position re-
quested 
tPM_2 
Safety criteria are 
met, point Rev 
position request 
PPM_3 
Point is moving to 
Nr position 
tPM_3  
(tPM_6) Request ignored 
PPM_4 
Point is moving to 
Rev position 
tPM_4 Point left the Rev 
position 
PPM_5 
Point is in Nr 
position 
tPM_5 Point left the Nr 
position 
PPM_6 
Point is in Rev 
position 
tPM_7 
(tPM_8) 
Point reached to Nr 
(Rev) position 
PPM_7 
Fault type F1 has 
occurred 
tPM_9 
(tPM_10) 
Predefined filter 
time has expired 
PPM_8 Point is faulty (F1) 
tPM_11 
(tPM_12) 
Nr (Rev) position 
request 
PPM_9 
Fault type F2 has 
occurred 
tPM_13 
(tPM_14) 
Point moved to Nr 
(Rev) position and 
the fault acknowl-
edged 
PPM_10 Point is faulty (F2) tPM_f1 
Point indication 
fault 
PPM_11 
Unobservable fault 
restriction 
tPM_f2 Point indication 
fault 
PPM_12 Point is faulty (F3) tPM_f3 Point position fault 
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Fig. 4. PN model of a railway point and its diagnoser (not diagnosable). 
 
4 MODIFIED V-MODEL LIFECYCLE 
Here, the modification of the V-model by adding the DES-based fault diagnosis scheme is explained. As mentioned in 
[4], [33], and [34], the required workforce and the cost of the development process of the software increases towards 
the end with respect to the initial phases of the development life cycle. The proposed modification to the V-model ena-
bles designers to check their software modules one more time before proceeding to the coding phase. This additional 
control is realized by checking the diagnosability of each module. 
As mentioned in Section III, if a module is diagnosable, then it fully meets the software requirements, particularly 
for requirements related to failure modes. In the usual 
software development process, the fulfillment of the re-
quirements are checked by realizing the module tests. Each 
requirement should be tested at least once. Diagnosability 
analysis allows us to check software requirement – soft-
ware module compatibility before obtaining the software 
source code. 
This intermediate phase can be considered as time-
consuming and an increase in workload. However, rather 
than turning back from the module testing phase to the 
module design phase, the proposed phase provides a final 
inspection of modules before proceeding to the coding and 
module testing phases. The proposed enhanced V-model is 
shown in Fig. 5. 
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                       Fig. 5. Enhanced V-model (Y-Yes, N-No). 
 
 
TABLE 2 
DEFINITIONS OF TRANSITIONS AND PLACES IN THE MODELS GIV-
EN IN FIG. 4. 
Place Definition Transition Definition 
PPM_1 
Point is moving to 
Nr position 
tPM_1 (tPM_2) 
Movement request 
is received and 
safety criteria are 
met for Nr (Rev) 
position 
PPM_2 
Point is moving to 
Rev position 
tPM_3 (tPM_4) 
Point reached to Nr 
(Rev) position 
PPM_3 
Point position is 
Nr 
tPM_5 (tPM_6) 
Point request to Nr 
(Rev) position 
PPM_4 
Point position is 
Rev 
tPM_7 (tPM_8) 
Point moved to Nr 
(Rev) position and 
the fault acknowl-
edged 
PPM_5 
Fault type F1 or F2 
has occurred 
tPM_9 
Predefined filter 
time has expired 
PPM_6 Point is faulty (F3) tPM_f1 (tPM_f2) 
Point indication 
fault 
PPM_7 
Point is moving 
from one position 
to another 
tPM_f3 Point position fault 
 
  
The proposed modification (Fig. 5) has three unique advantages. 
1. It checks whether the constructed model covers all software requirements related to faults. 
If the developed software model is not diagnosable, then the software model does not contain all software require-
ments. 
2. It decreases costs through early detection of modeling deficiencies before proceeding to V-model coding and testing phases. 
As can be seen in Fig. 5, after proceeding to the coding phase, the designer can only go back to the module design 
phase at the end of the module tests. The cost of fixing an error at the design phase is 3–8 units, whereas the cost of 
fixing an error at the testing phase is 21–78 units [34-36]. Another study showed that, it is 5 times more expensive to fix 
a problem at the design stage than in the course of initial requirements, 10 times more expensive to fix it through the 
coding phase, 20 to 50 times more expensive to fix it at acceptance testing and, 100 to 200 times more expensive to fix 
that error in the course of actual operation [37]. 
3. It enables designers to write simple and more readable code. 
This is explained with a case study. An example PN model of a Two-Aspect Signal (TAS) and its diagnoser is given 
in Fig. 6. The notations of the transitions and places of the models in Fig. 6 are shown in Table III. 
It is assumed that two faults may occur in a TAS. These faults are identified as follows: 
 F1: Both signal aspects are lit at the same time; 
 F2: No signals are lit. 
A detailed example can be seen in [38]. 
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                      Fig. 6. TAS PN model and its diagnoser. 
 
The Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) code snippet 
of the TAS model with and without a diagnoser is shown 
in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8, respectively. As can be seen in Fig. 7(a), 
the model with the diagnoser is simpler. 
For the TAS PLC code given in Fig. 7(a),(b), the 
diagnoser compares the actual states of the PN model with 
its faulty states. When the faulty state of the diagnoser is 
fully matched with the actual PN states, the diagnoser sets 
the corresponding output to logic 1. This is illustrated in 
Fig. 9. 
 
TABLE 3 
DEFINITIONS OF TRANSITIONS AND PLACES IN THE MODELS GIV-
EN IN FIG. 6. 
Place Definition Transition Definition 
PS2_1 Signal is red tS2_1 
Turn signal to 
green 
PS2_2 Signal is green tS2_2 Turn signal to red 
PS2_3 
Fault type F1 has 
occurred 
tS2_3 
Signal turned to red 
and the fault 
acknowledged 
PS2_4 
Fault type F2 has 
occurred 
tS2_4 
Signal turned to red 
and the fault 
acknowledged 
PS2_F1 
Unobservable fault 
restriction 
tS2_f1 Point aspect fault 
PS2_F2 
Unobservable fault 
restriction 
tS2_f2 
Point indication 
fault 
 
  
PN model of the TAS
PN states
PN transitions
Firing conditions
 
Fig. 7.(a). TAS model with diagnoser.. 
 
Faulty states of the 
diagnoser given in Fig. 6
 
Fig. 7(b).  The diagnoser block of the TAS. 
 
 
Fig. 8(a).  TAS model without diagnoser. 
 
  
Decision of the faults
 
Fig. 8(b).  Decision of the faults without diagnoser. 
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Fig. 9.  Decision of the diagnoser given in Fig. 7(a),(b). 
 
Moreover, in the illustration of the preferred organizational structure of the railway-related functional safety stand-
ard EN 50128, the requirement manager, the designer, and the implementer can be the same person for all safety integ-
rity levels [22]. The preferred organizational structure of the enhanced V-model is given in Fig. 10. 
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PM ASR
VER, DDes
SIL3 & SIL4
INT, TST
PM ASR
VER, VAL, DDes
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shall not report to the Project Manager
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can be the same organization
 
Fig. 10.  Preferred organizational structure for the enhanced V-model (PM: Project Manager, RQM: Requirement Manager, Des: Designer, 
IMP: Implementer, VER: Verifier, VAL: Validator, DDes: Diagnoser Designer, ASR: Assessor). 
5. CONCLUSION 
Faults in a safety-critical system (or its subsystems) may cause severe harm to humans (e.g., railway, aircraft, and nu-
clear power station control systems). Therefore, the development steps of software for such safety-critical systems must 
be executed very carefully. Designers, developers, and engineers must consider the recommendations of both the in-
ternational safety standards and the national rules to satisfy the required safety level and fulfill requirements. Develop-
ing software for such systems is guided by several software development life cycles, such as the well-known V-model. 
Although enhancing the V-model with DES-based fault diagnosis is time consuming, however, the advantages of 
this intermediate step are threefold: (1) it checks whether the developed model fulfills all software requirements, espe-
cially those related to the failure mode; (2) the code developed with a diagnoser is simpler than the code produced 
without a diagnoser; and (3) an early check of the models is possible before proceeding to the testing phase (right side 
of the V-model) because the V-model leads developers from the module testing phase to the module design phase 
rather than the coding phase. 
Moreover, when costs and work hours are considered, adding such an intermediate step to the V-model can result 
in considerable benefits to both project management and product development departments. 
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